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ABSTRACT 
Firms that go public on global stock markets are not obliged to disclose earnings forecasts in 
their prospectuses. We use this fact to examine the shipping industry, where most firms issue 
earnings forecasts during the IPO process, and thus provide unique, international-level evidence. 
We find overall pessimistic forecasts of ship owners, primarily because of the industry’s uncer-
tain and volatile environment. High ship owner participation after going public is associated with 
less accurate earnings forecasts. Our results further indicate that financial leverage, a listing in an 
emerging stock market, and global market conditions are other main factors responsible for in-
accurate earnings forecasts. 
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1. Introduction 
Management earnings forecasts represent one of the most important sources of information 
about listed companies and initial public offerings (IPOs) (Clarkson (1992), Bagisnki et al. (2002), Jog 
and McConomy (2003), Bagisnki et al. (2004), Hirst, Koonce, and Venkataraman, (2008), Godman et al 
(2014)). Beyer et al. (2010) report that approximately 55% of the accounting information available to 
U.S. investors comes from such forecasts.2 Today, the popularity of voluntary management earnings 
forecasts in the U.S. has also become the dominant disclosure mechanism worldwide.3 Huang et al. 
(2014) indicate that its mandate was one of the most significant corporate disclosure decisions in history, 
especially for small investors who have limited access to private information. Disclosure reduces the cost 
of capital for firms, and it can combat problems like asymmetric information and agency problems (Dye, 
(1985); Healy and Palepu, (2001)). Moreover, it enhances transparency, building firms’ positive reputa-
tions and contributing to an expansion in their investor base. 
In this study, we exploit the fact that a great part of global shipping firms voluntarily choose to 
issue IPO earnings forecasts. The policy of issuing earnings forecasts has drawn the attention of finance 
researchers because of its influence on investor decisions. Within transportation research, the interest in 
the various facets of financial reporting has been ongoing, with a focus on, e.g., alternative accounting 
policy choices (Tan et al., (2002)), intangible assets reporting (Lev, (2003)), and managerial discretion in 
assessing the reliability of financial reporting. 
However, two factors received less attention in the analysis of financial reporting and disclosure 
of earnings forecasts in the transportation industry: 1) the quality of the signal that firms wish to transmit 
through earnings announcements to the financial markets and consequently to potential investors, and 2) 
                                                          
2 In 2010 alone, approximately 4,500 annual earnings forecasts were issued by 950 U.S. firms, according to First Call’s com-
pany-issued guidelines database. 
3 The majority of capital markets worldwide allow voluntary disclosure of management earnings forecasts, although, in the 
past, some countries mandated the practice (e.g., Canada, Greece, and Malaysia). Over the years, and largely because of signif-
icant forecasting errors, most local capital market commissions recommended that earnings forecasts become solely volun-
tary. 
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how the institutional setting serves to protect potential investors from being misled. The motivation for 
our study stems primarily from this gap in the literature. 
The shipping industry, with its global, highly competitive, and extremely volatile nature, is dis-
tinct.4 The majority of shipping companies that implemented an initial public offering (IPO) voluntarily 
announced their forecasted profits in their prospectus, thus contributing to the rise of a generally ac-
cepted regulatory system for corporate behavior. Nevertheless, many difficulties in forecasting earnings 
persist, because the industry is characterized by long-term investments and criticalities in accounting de-
cisions (e.g., cost capitalization, depreciation and residual value, and leasing) (Godman et al., (2014)). 
The importance of shipping lies in the fact that it constitutes an integral part of international 
trade. IPOs can provide shipping firms with critical resources for future expansion. They can secure the 
financial position of ship owners by providing them with their first substantial access to cash. The IPO 
prospectus provides potential investors with information that ought to help them making their invest-
ment decisions. It is common practice among shipping firms to make foreign listings due to the global-
ized nature of the industry, forcing managers to address the pronounced information asymmetries 
caused by the practical difficulties of information penetration among international investors. 
One of the mechanisms that enables companies to reduce these information asymmetries is 
the disclosure of earnings forecasts in their prospectuses (Jaggi et al. (2006)). To develop a better un-
derstanding of the relationship between management earnings forecasts and their informational con-
text in a globalized environment, a comprehensive analysis of the forecast characteristics is necessary. 
For example, do maritime IPOs report biased forecast earnings? Or, do they overstate or understate the 
information contained in their economic variables? In this article, we are particularly interested in U.S.-
                                                          
4 The definition of shipping we use refers to all listed companies in the shipping sector on major world exchanges, and it in-
cludes all corporations that own and/or operate ships, regardless of what subsector they belong to. Our study does not cap-
ture technical specifications or cargo, thus, we do not distinguish among different segments of the shipping industry. In 
general, the maritime industry is comprised of companies whose activities supply innovative services and products related to 
the traditional maritime sector. In general, the shipping industry includes all enterprises engaged in the business of designing, 
manufacturing, constructing, operating, acquiring, supplying, repairing and/or maintaining vessels, or components thereof, 
such as managing and/or operating shipping lines, customs brokerage services, shipyards, dry docks, marine railways, marine 
repair shops, shipping and freight forwarding services, and similar enterprises. 
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listed maritime IPOs. However, we also aim to determine whether there are any major differences com-
pared to our international sample. 
We compute earnings forecast errors and find pessimistic forecasts for the large majority of 
shipping IPOs. From our sample, we then identify the U.S.-listed companies, and observe that NYSE-
listed IPOs tend to announce pessimistic earnings in their prospectuses, while Nasdaq-listed IPOs pro-
vide relatively more optimistic forecasts. Companies that disclose earnings forecasts prior to an IPO left 
less money on the table when measured by the degree of underpricing. Overall, contrary to the existing 
U.S. literature, our findings indicate that ship owners and their management tend to provide pessimistic 
earnings forecasts, that is, actual earnings exceeded forecasted profits. We attribute this finding primarily 
to the sector’s highly volatile environment. 
We then proceed by studying the factors that determine the quality of forecast earnings and as-
semble our main hypothesis. The factors that affect forecasted earnings quality come from three sources: 
1) firm-specific idiosyncratic factors such as financial leverage, size, concentrated ownership, and age, 2) 
market-related factors such as the state of the shipping and stock markets, and 3) institutional factors 
such as Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and the mandatory application of Interna-
tional Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). We develop a general-to-specific (GETS) model, based on 
Hendry et al. (2013), and within it, use Lewbel’s (1997) methodology. Through model evaluation and 
reduction we end up with a well-specified model that allows us to extend the existing literature on earn-
ings forecasts. 
We also examine robustness for the location of the listing (domestic versus foreign) and the legal 
system (common versus civil law). Shipping IPOs experience higher forecast errors when they choose to 
list abroad rather than in their home country. Among foreign listings, there exists an overly high forecast 
inaccuracy for young, small, and highly financially leveraged shipping companies. To address legal system 
effects, we test for differences between civil and common law. We find that lower underpriced shipping 
IPOs tend to be associated with higher earnings forecast errors in a civil law environment, while in a 
common law environment it is the higher underpriced IPOs that fail to provide accurate forecasts. Final-
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ly, the change in the financial reporting mechanism from local GAAP to IFRS has contributed to more 
accurate management earnings forecasts. 
This paper makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, it analyses earnings fore-
cast accuracy in a cross-country setting by concentrating on a highly volatile sector. The maritime indus-
try, with its global character, offers a unique case because of the difficulties potential investors face in 
interpreting earnings forecasts announced by foreign listings. The uncertainty surrounding these compa-
nies makes the value of this information of great importance, even more so because over 90% of inter-
national trade is classified as sea trade (European Commission, 2010) and thus the maritime industry 
plays a crucial role in the global economy. 
Second, uur findings are of particular interest because they shed light on the trends of U.S.-listed 
shipping companies with respect to disclosure in general and earnings forecasts in particular.5 Third, we 
develop our arguments in the context of founders and/or ship owners who lead IPOs, that is, we exam-
ine IPOs where the original founders retained their equity stakes and board positions. The environment 
of these companies differs from that of the Berle and Means’ (1932) model of agency conflicts in public 
companies, where ownership is widely dispersed. The founders of shipping IPO firms are typically the 
largest shareholders and retain majority control even after the IPO (Wasserman, (2003)). 
Fourth, we offer new insights into the factors that influence earnings forecasts for shipping IP-
Os. For example, we find that a high financial leverage of shipping IPOs is associated with higher abso-
lute forecast errors. In contrast, the age of the IPO firm and “hot” market conditions tend to be associ-
ated with lower absolute forecast errors. 
Our study is related to the work on earnings forecasts of IPO firms of Lee et al. (1993) and Li 
and McConomy (2004) for Canada; Cormier and Martinez (2006) for France; Gounopoulos, Kraft, and 
Skinner (2016) for Greece; Jaggi (1997), Cheng and Firth (2000) and Chen, Firth, and Krishnan (2001) 
                                                          
5 An earlier study by Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough (2002) on U.S.-listed companies indicates that companies are reluctant 
to provide earnings forecasts in prospectuses because of the potential for lawsuits under SEC Rule 10b-5. U.S. Congress en-
acted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 to encourage firms to disclose forward-looking information by 
reducing legal exposure. Nevertheless, during the IPO process, management still appears to be more hesitant of providing 
earnings forecasts. 
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for Hong Kong; Jelic, Saadouni, and Briston (2001) for Malaysia; Firth and Smith (1992) for New Zea-
land; Firth et al. (1995) for Singapore and the U.K. We extend Keasey and McGuinness’s (1991) work, 
who examine the relationship between management earnings forecasting and IPO outcomes, by examin-
ing a comprehensive sample of international maritime IPOs. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Sec-
tion 3 develops our testable hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data and methodology. Section 5 shows 
our empirical results. Section 6 provides a discussion of our findings. Section 7 presents some additional 
robustness tests, and section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Theoretical framework 
The role of management in disclosing earnings forecasts during prospectus preparation has re-
ceived a fair amount of attention in the literature. The relation between voluntary disclosure and infor-
mation quality was modeled in the work of Verrecchia (1983) and Dye (1985). They explore the choice 
to voluntarily disclose information through formal analytical modelling. In essence, Verrecchia (1983) 
shows that, due to the existence of proprietary costs associated with information disclosure, traders are 
unable to interpret non-disclosure unambiguously as bad news. As such, there exists a threshold level of 
disclosure that increases in proprietary cost. 
Similarly, Dye (1985) suggests that, in the case of non-disclosure, investors may be uncertain 
about the nature of the information a manager possesses. He finds that signalling theory plays a role as 
long as there are information asymmetries between managers and investors and information is proprie-
tary. Therefore, one can view the models of Verrecchia (1983) and Dye (1985) as restrictive cases of dis-
closure choice, but the application of their work to disclosure decisions remains valid (Guidry and Pat-
ten, 2012). 
Lang and Lundholm (1993) conclude that “in the face of adverse selection [...] firms whose per-
formance exceeds a certain threshold will disclose, while those below the threshold will not.” Clarkson et 
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al. (2008) posit that firms with better performance will wish to signal that success via disclosure, while 
lesser-performing companies will remain silent in the hopes of being judged average instead of poorer-
performing. Hopwood (2009) argues that, even when disclosure occurs, companies may be using it to 
reduce any questions they face. In particular they can retain an air of openness from reporting, while ac-
tually giving little other information away. 
We further note that IFRS adoption has improved the information environment for the firms in 
our sample. Based on disclosure theory, an increase in mandatory disclosure should be accompanied by 
an increase in the incentives to voluntarily disclose (Dye (1990); Guidry and Patten (2012)). 
2.2 Management earnings forecasts in IPOs  
Disclosure of management earnings forecasts is largely voluntary. Such forecasts are key mechanisms by 
which managers not only establish or alter market earnings expectations, but also develop their reputa-
tions for transparent and accurate reporting (Hirst, Koonce, and Venkataraman (2008). Since it is such a 
key component of investors’ decisions, the accuracy of disclosed earnings forecasts has received signifi-
cant attention in the literature. Evidence of the accuracy of management earnings reveals absolute fore-
cast errors (AFEs) ranging from as low as 10.4% for Singapore (Firth, (1998)), to as high as 1,138% re-
ported by Lee et al. (1993) for Australia. 
Gounopoulos, Kraft, and Skinner (2016) examine 305 Greek IPOs and provide a direct compari-
son between those obligated to provide earnings forecasts in their prospectuses with those allowed to 
voluntarily disclose their earnings forecasts. Their study reveals that managers’ behavior changed and 
tended to become less pessimistic: underestimated earnings during the mandatory policy period (1993-
2000) were converted to more optimistic outlooks during the voluntary policy period (2001-2009). The 
accuracy of earnings forecasts increased following the introduction of voluntary disclosure, but perhaps 
not to a level that would completely satisfy regulators and investors. 
Prior studies have also focused on why managers choose to issue forecasts and what are the like-
ly consequences (Ajinkya and Gift (1984); Skinner (1994); Verrecchia, (2001); Hirst, Koonce, and Venka-
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taraman (2008)). Most extant literature addresses the antecedents and consequences of forecast disclo-
sure, while there is little work on the aspect of managerial choice regarding forecast characteristics. To 
the extent that forecast characteristics have been examined, they have been treated primarily as exoge-
nous variables (Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough (2004)). Given that managers exert much greater con-
trol over forecast characteristics than over forecast antecedents and consequences, it is surprising that 
the decisions they make about forecast characteristics are comparatively less well understood.6 
This study investigates the value relevance of earnings forecast disclosure in the shipping indus-
try. It is the first global sector study that uses the disclosure/non-disclosure dichotomy to distinguish 
forecasters from non-forecasters. We include several control variables to account for the fact that IPO 
values are influenced by factors other than earnings forecasts. For example, ex-ante uncertainty is associ-
ated with float value (Ritter, (1984); Rock, (1986); Beatty and Ritter, (1986). Our proxies for ex-ante un-
certainty include leverage (Jelic et al., (1998); Morsfield and Tan, (2006)), and the length of the opera-
tional history, in essence, firm age (Jaggi, (1997); Jelic et al., 1998; Jog and McConomy, (2003)). Moreo-
ver, we suggest that signaling float quality through low proportions of retained ownership by ship own-
ers strengthens IPO value (Hughes, (1986); Clarkson et al., (1992); Lee et al., (1993)). We also analyze the 
timing of going public by incorporating general market conditions (Ritter, (1984); Ljungqvist, Nanda, 
and Singh, (2006); Ivanov and Lewis, (2008). 
2.3 Shipping IPOs 
Globalization has had a huge impact on the maritime industry and helped drive the sector to un-
precedented levels. Partially because of low-cost maritime transport, which helped make the shift of in-
dustrial production to emerging countries possible, ships are now involved in about 90% of global trade. 
Such a rapid pace of change required planning for how to raise capital and finance investments. Initially, 
most maritime companies secured bank loans, but they quickly became insufficient for the level of 
                                                          
6 For example, relatively little is known about why managers decide to issue forecasts with external versus internal attribu-
tions, why they issue them in conjunction with other disclosures, and the nature of the content of these other disclosures 
(Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough, 2004). 
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growth. The next step was to raise equity through the stock markets. A record 81 companies issued IP-
Os over the 2003-2007 period, raising more than $6 billion. A unique aspect of shipping IPOs is that 
most do not list on the stock exchange of their country of incorporation, but instead on the leading 
global stock markets: NYSE, Nasdaq, and LSE. Greece is a particular example, where none of the 29 
companies that went public listed on the local Athens stock exchange. 
Shipping IPOs are distinct from those of ordinary industrial or service companies because the 
market value of a shipping company is often closely correlated with the underlying value of the physical 
asset (vessel). Due to the extensive amount of information on international vessel purchases and sales 
markets, shipping IPOs tend to exhibit lower information asymmetry, which deepens investors’ risk ap-
petites. Another unique characteristic of the sector is that ship owners, as a signaling device, typically re-
tain large holdings in their companies. 
2.4 International Setting of IPOs  
The international setting of IPOs was explored earlier by Chowdhry and Sherman (1996), 
Dewenter and Malatesta (1997), Torstila (2003), Boulton, Smart, and Zutter (2011), Thomadakis, 
Gounopoulos, and Nounis (2012), Lin, Pukthuanthong, and Walker (2013), Shi, Pukthuanthong, and 
Walker (2013), Cattaneo, Meoli, and Vismara (2015), and Thomadakis et al. (2016). A study directly re-
lated to ours is Boulton, Smart, and Zutter (2011), who examine earnings quality and international IPO 
underpricing. They find that IPOs are underpriced less in countries where public firms produce higher 
quality earnings information. It appears that the impact of low earnings quality on underpricing is partial-
ly offset by the use of a top-tier underwriter. Moreover, Shi, Pukthuanthong, and Walker (2013) examine 
whether and how disclosure regulation works in international IPO markets. They find a significant nega-
tive correlation between IPO underpricing and disclosure regulation, indicating that more extensive dis-
closure requirements reduce information asymmetries in IPO markets. 
2.5 Legal framework to publish earnings forecasts in IPO prospectuses  
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The legal environment of a prospectus, in which management earnings forecasting takes place, 
varies by disclosure status (mandatory versus voluntary), country law status (civil versus common), and 
accounting standards (local GAAP versus IFRS). Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough (2002) focus on 
management earnings forecast disclosures in the U.S. and Canada, two otherwise similar business envi-
ronments that feature different legal regimes.7 They document that Canadian securities laws and judicial 
interpretations create a far less litigious environment than in the U.S. Therefore, compared to the U.S., 
Canada exhibits a much greater frequency of management earnings forecast disclosure. 
Skinner (1994), along with Kasznik and Lev (1995), document that legal liability increases U.S. 
firms’ incentives to disclose management earnings forecasts when earnings news is bad. Moreover, U.S. 
managers are more likely to issue forecasts during interim periods in which earnings decrease. Canadian 
managers do not exhibit that tendency. Instead, Canadian managers issue more forecasts when earnings 
are increasing, and their forecasts include annual rather than interim earnings. More generally, managers 
seem more likely to issue forecasts, both good and bad, in less litigious environments. 
Huang et al. (2014) argue that capital market regulators must assess whether mandating manage-
ment earnings forecasts will improve the information environment or be counterproductive. They exam-
ine the efficacy of forecast regulation in the emerging market of China, which allows voluntary forecasts 
in some circumstances but mandates management earnings forecasts in others, such as anticipated losses, 
outsize profits, and large changes in earnings from the previous year. Their results suggest that the Chi-
nese mandate substantially increases the quantity of information available to investors, particularly by 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Mandatory forecasts tend to be less timely and less precise, suggesting 
they may be of lower quality than voluntary forecasts. Nonetheless, investors react to mandatory fore-
casts as if they are useful. 
Jaggi et al. (2006) explore earnings forecast disclosure regulations in the Taiwanese market. They 
observe optimistic forecasts that are driven mainly by weak investor protection rights under the Taiwan-
                                                          
7 Among other important determinants of the value relevance of accounting data, the U.S. and Canada share a market-
oriented financial system, private sector standard setting, low influence of tax rules on financial accounting measurements, 
and higher spending on external auditing (Ali and Hwang, 2000). 
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ese legal system. A similar observation applies to the legal systems of other countries in the Asian Pacific 
Basin region (La Porta et al. (1998); Fan and Wong (2002)). Under such a framework, managers are en-
ticed to maximize their IPO proceeds by publishing optimistic forecasts in IPO prospectuses to send 
positive signals about a firm’s future performance. Mak’s (1996) study on New Zealand, an environment 
with low legal risk, shows that the greater the information asymmetry and/or the specific risk, the more 
earnings forecasts are disclosed in IPO prospectuses. 
2.6 Accounting standards for earnings forecasts on various stock exchanges 
Many shipping companies have become increasingly dissatisfied with local GAAP and its volu-
minous rules for dealing with accounting issues. As a result, IFRS is now widely accepted. It has helped 
open the doors of the global marketplace, potentially improving liquidity and access to capital by offer-
ing transparency in the form of better disclosure to investors. 
Many shipping IPOs that have gone public on European stock exchanges transitioned to IFRS 
immediately after their adoption in 2005. Foreign companies that chose to go public on U.S. stock ex-
changes were required to follow early adoption of U.S. GAAP for fiscal years ending on or after De-
cember 15, 2009, with mandatory transition after December 2014. As a result, the majority of the com-
panies in our sample have gone public with U.S. GAAP. 
There are many key differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRS, including their fundamental 
premises. At the highest level, U.S. GAAP is more of a rules-based system, while IFRS is more princi-
ples-based. Also, under U.S. GAAP, voluminous guidance attempts to address nearly every conceivable 
accounting problem that could arise. In contrast, IFRS contains a short volume of principles-based 
standards, which consequently require more judgment. Beyond the issue of rules versus principles, IFRS 
also can pose particular technical accounting challenges to companies in the shipping industry.8 
2.7 Foreign (international) listings in the U.S. 
                                                          
8 The internet appendix discusses differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRS that are of particular interest to shipping com-
panies. 
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Many ship owners choose to list their companies on a foreign (international) stock exchange ra-
ther than on the market of their home country of incorporation. Arguably, this decision is motivated by 
the industry’s international customer base, broader investor base, better investor protection laws, superi-
or access to capital to fulfill investment plans, reduced risk premiums, higher levels of information dis-
closure, increased liquidity, and greater visibility (Foerster and Karolyi (1999); Lins, Strickland, and Zen-
ner (2005); Karolyi (2006)). 
The choice of a domestic or foreign market for the listing venue has direct implications for man-
agement earnings forecasts. Many Greek maritime companies, as well as several other European ones, 
have opted to go public in the U.S. Rather than reporting mandatory IFRS since January 2005, they were 
required to prepare their accounts under U.S. GAAP. Only after November 2007 did they have the 
choice to report using either U.S. GAAP or IFRS. 
Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) (2010) (2013) show that a U.S. listing reduces the extent to 
which controlling shareholders can engage in expropriation, thus increasing a firm’s ability to take ad-
vantage of growth opportunities. They also find that companies that list in the U.S. are associated with 
higher valuation premiums compared to other firms in their home countries. Bruner, Chaplinsky, and 
Ramchand (2004) show that foreign firms that issue IPOs in the U.S. experience approximately the same 
underpricing as U.S. domestic IPOs. They argue that any risks of foreign IPOs arising from, e.g., asym-
metric information or country risk are offset by U.S. domestic IPO characteristics. Moreover, there is no 
significant difference in underpricing between emerging and developed market IPOs in the U.S. In con-
trast, Bell, Moore, and Al-Shammari (2008) find that firms located in countries with higher levels of eco-
nomic freedom are less underpriced than IPOs of firms from countries that enjoy lower levels of eco-
nomic freedom. 
Previous studies also examine the motivation and the economic benefits of a U.S. listing. The 
market segmentation hypothesis is the most oft-cited motive. Miller (1999) tests this hypothesis and 
finds that a foreign listing on a U.S. stock exchange by a non-U.S. firm is associated with a positive im-
pact on firm value. He argues that a foreign listing allows investors to avoid foreign border barriers to 
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investment that can arise from regulatory restrictions, such as the misalignment between IFRS and U.S. 
GAAP in our study. Also preventing investors from investing in these markets is lack of knowledge 
about a market (Merton (1987). Removing barriers and integrating markets allows for more efficient di-
versification. 
Non-U.S. firms are often controlled by founders and major shareholders, and this is particularly 
true in the shipping industry. From the controlling shareholders’ perspective, there may be costs and 
benefits of a foreign listing. Most importantly, foreign listings provide external financing for investment 
activities, but they may also limit the ability to extract private benefits. 
 
3. Development of Testable Hypothesis 
We propose that the factors affecting forecasted earnings quality have three sources: 1) a firm-
specific source that includes idiosyncratic factors, 2) a market-related source, and 3) an institutional 
source. To develop our hypotheses, we next discuss each of these factors. 
3.1 Idiosyncratic factors 
The importance of idiosyncratic factors for the quality of forecasted earnings was highlighted by 
many authors, including Jelic, Saadouni, and Briston (1998), Chen, Firth, and Krishnan (2001), Jog and 
McConomy (2003), and Morsfield and Tan (2006). Most importantly, given the cyclicality of freight rev-
enues and vessel prices, the debt capacity of shipping firms and the related costs of financial distress are 
of primary concern for financial managers in the maritime industry. Increasing financial leverage can 
make the residual position of shareholders more risky and the cash flow to equity more volatile. As a re-
sult, increasing financial leverage will likely decrease the accuracy of earnings forecasts and increase fore-
cast errors. Supporting this notion, Jelic, Saadouni, and Briston (1998) report that financial leverage is 
negatively correlated with average forecast errors. Morsfield and Tan (2006) argue that highly leveraged 
companies have an incentive to manipulate earnings upward to avoid covenant defaults. However, they 
also face stronger monitoring from debtholders. Therefore, the higher a firm’s leverage, the greater will 
be the likelihood that manager will choose accounting procedures that shift reported earnings from fu-
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ture periods to the current period. 
The shipping industry is dominated by businesses with deep-rooted family ties. During the IPO 
process, the founders generally have two main concerns: to retain control of the company and to ensure 
the success of the IPO. Irrespective of the specific institutional setting, owners retain control in most 
publicly-listed shipping firms. Chen, Firth, and Krishnan (2001) and Jog and McConomy (2003) find a 
positive correlation between the number of inside shareholders post-IPO and the level of accuracy of 
the earnings forecasts. Blockholders have privileged access to company information, thus they can likely 
issue more accurate earnings forecasts. This notion suggests a positive association between the stake of 
the largest shareholder and forecast accuracy and a negative one between the stake of the largest share-
holder and the forecast error. 
Earlier findings by Chen, Firth, and Krishnan (2001) indicate that IPOs with large outside own-
ership after the issue exhibit lower forecast errors. Bruner, Chaplinsky, and Ramchand (2006) report lev-
els of founder ownership after going public of 39%. Their findings support the tenets of agency theory 
that concentrated ownership improves IPO performance. Therefore, we expect that shipping companies 
with high founder participation after going public will choose to provide earnings forecasts in their pro-
spectuses, and if management decides to release earnings forecasts, they will prove to be more accurate. 
3.2 Market-related factors 
Firms tend to time their IPOs when information asymmetry is low (Bessler, Drobetz, and Grue-
ninger (2011)). During upward-trending periods, adverse selection costs are relatively low. Therefore, 
riskier firms with more volatile cash flows, which would otherwise not have access to public equity, may 
tap the IPO market during these periods (Lucas and McDonald, (1990) Baker and Wurgler, (2002)). 
Boehme and Colak (2012) document that for stocks issued during hot IPO market conditions the flow 
of information is lower. 
The maritime industry uses the Baltic Dry Index (BDI) to assess whether the market is in an up-
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ward- or downward-trending phase and to infer the level of volatility.9 During normal market conditions, 
when the growth in traded volume is predictable, freight rates tend to be in a low to medium range and 
exhibit little volatility (e.g., during the pre-2003 market). The growth in demand, due to the emergence of 
China as a main importer starting in 2003, caused a boom in freight markets that continued until just be-
fore the financial crises.10 One would expect that stability of freight rates, coupled with low volatility, en-
ables financial managers to release more accurate earnings forecasts. 
3.3 Institutional factors 
Many countries with sizeable capital markets, such as Australia, EU members, Hong Kong, and 
South Africa, required publicly traded companies (with certain exceptions) to present consolidated finan-
cial statements in conformity with IFRS for each financial year beginning on or after January 1, 2005. 
Other countries, such as Japan, decided to adopt IFRS in the future, but allow companies to voluntarily 
report under its guidelines. While mandatory adoption of IFRS was widespread in 2005, there are still 
firms that follow other accounting standards. In some countries, such as the U.S., China, and Malaysia, 
firms were not allowed to use IFRS. 
Prior research indicates that higher-quality reporting reduces the problem of adverse selection in 
securities markets (Healy et al. (1985); Welker (1995); Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2007)), reduces the 
cost of capital (Botosan, (1997); Hail and Leuz, (2006), and improves the efficiency of information in-
termediaries (Lang and Lundholm, (1996); Healy et al., (1999); Hope, (2003)). If IFRS are higher-quality 
and provide better information, then IFRS adoption should have the potential to generate these benefits. 
In fact, Barth et al. (2008) and Landsman, Maydew, and Thornock (2012) find that firms’ reporting quali-
ty increases after voluntary IFRS adoption. 
                                                          
9 The BDI is a leading economic indicator that tracks the worldwide international shipping prices of various dry bulk cargoes, 
such as coal, iron ore, and grain. 
10 Sharp increases in freight rates accompanied the higher freight rate volatility (Drobetz, Richter, and Wambach, 2012). This 
trend is consistent with the theoretical shipping market supply and demand model, which predicts larger shocks in up markets 
and smaller shocks in down ones. In addition to this asymmetric size effect, this framework posits that positive shocks have a 
higher impact on conditional volatility than negative shocks of the same magnitude, based on the convexity of the supply 
curve. 
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We investigate the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on managements’ forecast accuracy in 
IPOs. Many studies (Byard et al. 2011); Tan, Wang, and Welker, (2011); Glaum et al., (2011); Horton et 
al., (2013), among others) reveal that forecast errors decrease for firms that mandatorily adopt IFRS. In 
contrast, we address the question whether IFRS adoption has led to an increase in earnings forecast ac-
curacy even when the forecasts took place prior to the stock market listing. Put differently, we test 
whether the IRFS-related increase in forecast accuracy also holds in an IPO context. We expect that pri-
or to IFRS implementation investors were less capable of anticipating deviations from forecasted earn-
ings. We attribute this largely to the flexibility that managers may have had to distort accounting figures 
under the various local GAAP, without tight control by the local authorities. 
We further analyze the impact of the institutional framework on management earnings fore-
casts. La Porta et al. (2000) indicate that common law countries provide the strongest protections to 
outside investors, to both shareholders and creditors. French civil law countries have the weakest protec-
tions, and German and Scandinavian civil laws fall in between. These differences should also be reflected 
in the accuracy of management earnings forecasts. 
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1 Data description 
To test our hypothesis that idiosyncratic, market-based, and institutional factors affect manage-
ment earnings forecast accuracy, our initial sample included 203 internationally listed maritime compa-
nies for the January 1987-December 2011 period. We excluded 14 firms because financial data was not 
available. For the remaining 189 firms, of which 68 are registered on U.S. stock exchanges, 78 decided 
not to announce earnings forecasts. The remaining 111 issued earnings forecasts. We mandated the 
availability of the following items as prerequisites for inclusion in our final sample: IPO prospectus, fi-
nancial statements for the year prior to the offering, forecasts of profits before taxes, and stock prices 
for at least 12 months or 250 trading days post-IPO. The majority of information used in our study was 
extracted manually from prospectuses, annual reports, and financial statements. Such data included the 
earnings forecasts from the prospectus, the actual forecasts from annual reporting, the legal system of 
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incorporation, the country of listing’s actual adoption of IFRS, and the price range of the offer price. 
We used the Bloomberg database as our main source for downloading the IPO prospectuses and 
any missing annual reports. The standard stock prices for U.S. companies came from CRSP, and market 
indices for non-U.S. companies from Datastream. These databases left some gaps, so we also conducted 
manual data collection (i.e., for countries such as India, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Russia). We col-
lected historical accounting information from published financial statements in Compustat at the end of 
fiscal year t-1. Because we are interested in underwriter reputation in an international context, we fol-
lowed the updated version of Loughran and Ritter (2004), available on Jay Ritter’s website, which ranks 
1,154 underwriters by quality. 
Because the window of opportunity for an IPO is related to market conditions, we construct a 
dummy variable for “hot” periods (Lowry, (2003); Derrien and Kecskes, (2007); Bancel and Mittoo, 
(2009). As a metric for hot periods, we use the number of IPOs performed during a given quarter 
((Ritter et al. 2013)) and the return of the Baltic Dry Index (BDI) as well as the stock exchange of listing 
(see Appendix A). 
Panel A of Table 1 provides the number of annual listings of the 189 IPOs in our sample, and 
classifies them into “provide forecast” or “no forecast” depending on whether the IPO prospectuses 
contained earnings forecasts. Moreover, Panels B-D in Table 1 report the summary statistics for three 
different subsamples: the 111 shipping IPO firms with earnings forecasts, the 78 shipping IPO firms 
without earnings forecasts, and the 49 U.S.-listed shipping IPO firms with earnings forecasts. As summa-
rized in panel E (using a test for differences in means and medians), the companies that provided earn-
ings forecasts were older (34.55 years versus 20.83 years) and larger (higher capitalization at the IPO date 
of USD 476 million versus 360 million) than those that did not. Moreover, these companies’ prospectus-
es were signed by more reputable underwriters (0.56/1 versus 0.41/1)11 and characterized by a higher 
percentage of ownership of the largest shareholder post-IPO (35.97% versus 28.29%). Finally, Panel F 
                                                          
11 We use Jay Ritter’s IPO underwriter reputation rankings over the 1980-2009 period (available at 
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/). A part of this database was also used in Loughran and Ritter (2004). 
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summarizes firm characteristics by country. 
[Please Insert Table 1 about here] 
4.2 Empirical methodology 
The determinants of earnings forecast errors in a global industry are conceptually intriguing, but 
pose some methodological problems. In particular, we need to control for both sample selection and 
endogeneity in order to obtain unbiased and consistent estimates (Greene, 2006; Semykina and 
Wooldridge, 2010). Therefore, our model is developed in two stages: (1) a selection equation, and (2) an 
outcome equation. In stage 1, we specify selection through a probit model of the functional form: Prob 
(being selected in the sample) = f (determinants of the selection). To control for potential selection bias, 
the selection mechanism is modelled using the inverse Mills ratio. 
The inverse Mills ratio shows how the variables included in the first stage are related to the sam-
ple selection (Heckman, (1979)). Technically, it is the ratio of the probability density function to the cu-
mulative distribution function of a distribution. Its use is often motivated by the following property of 
the truncated normal distribution: if x is a random variable distributed normally, with mean μ and vari-
ance σ2, then it holds: 
E (x|x>α) = μ + σ[{φ((α-μ)/σ)}/{1-Φ((α-μ)/σ)}],       (1) 
where α is a constant, φ denotes the standard normal density function, and Φ denotes the stand-
ard normal cumulative distribution function. The term in brackets on the right-hand side of equation (2) 
denotes the inverse Mills ratio. 
In our case, studying earnings forecasts, a selection problem may occur in a truncated sample be-
cause earnings forecasts are only available, for example, for listed firms with higher average leverage and 
concentrated ownership. As a result, the sample may not be random, and the estimated impact of the 
determinants on forecasted earnings may be biased. In fact, the shipping firms in our global IPO sample 
are more homogeneous than the population, especially with regard to size. For example, because size 
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tends to be negatively correlated with corporate governance, as measured by the extent of concentrated 
ownership, the association between forecasted earnings (and their quality) and corporate governance may 
be underestimated. The inclusion of the inverse Mills ratio in the structural equation will help to derive 
unbiased estimates. 
Using a probit model, the probability of being in the selected model is estimated in stage 1 as a 
function of variables explaining the selection. Next, we construct the inverse Mills ratio, which we in-
clude in the structural (outcome) equation in stage 2 (see equation (3) below). In particular, in stage 1 the 
selection equation is estimated for our 189 listed shipping companies: 
Probit (Announcementi) = f (AGEi, SIZEi, CONCi, FLEVi, EXCi, H/Ci, MAIRi, UNDi).    (2) 
Our selection model in equation (2) includes the age of the company when it was listed (AGE), 
firm size (logarithm of the total market capitalization at the IPO date, SIZE), ownership concentration 
(percentage ownership of the highest shareholder post-IPO, CONC), financial leverage (debt-to-equity 
ratio, FLEV), the stock exchange dummy variable (EXC), the general market condition dummy variable 
(H/C), raw initial return (MAIR)12, and the underwriter dummy variable (UND). An important assump-
tion is that the two variables EXC and UND will potentially influence selection, but not the outcome. 
Therefore, they are omitted from the structural equation in stage 2. All variables are described in detail in 
Appendix A. 
Because the inverse Mills ratio is a non-linear function of the variables included in the first-stage 
probit model, call these X, the structural equation in stage 2 will be identified − because of this non-
linearity − even if all variables of X are included. However, the non-linearity of the inverse Mills ratio 
arises from the assumption of normality in the probit model. It remains questionable, even if normality 
has been tested, if this assumption should be used as the sole source of identification. Therefore, to 
                                                          
12 MAIRi,t denotes the market index-adjusted return of company i: MAIRi,t = |(Pi,1 – Pi,0)|/|Pi,0|−|(Ii,1 – Ii,0)|/|Ii,0|, where Pi,1  
denotes the closing price of company i at the end of the first trading day; Pi,0 is the offering price of company i provided in 
the prospectus; Ii,1 denotes the level of a broad index of the respective stock market at the end of the first trading day; and Ii,0  
is the index level on the date the prospectus of company i was issued. 
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make identification unambiguous, we use variables that are responsible for the correct specification of 
the selection equation, but which will be omitted from the outcome equation Sartori (2003). In our case, 
we drop from the outcome equation two variables that we consider relevant for the correct specification 
of the selection equation. The first is EXC, the stock exchange dummy variable with value 1 if the listing 
occurs in a developed market (and 0 otherwise). Arguably, in such markets, to attract investors and en-
hance their reputation, shipping firms are more likely to voluntarily announce earnings forecasts. The 
second variable excluded from the outcome equation is UND, the underwriter dummy variable with val-
ue of 1 if the underwriter is reputable (and 0 otherwise). The more reputable an underwriter is, the more 
likely it is for shipping firms to announce earnings forecasts. In contrast, these two variables should play 
no role for the magnitude of the forecasted earnings errors. To verify this conjecture, we re-estimate the 
outcome equation, include both EXC and UND, and apply a Wald test to test their joint significance. In 
results not reported, we find that the null hypothesis of being jointly not different from zero cannot be 
rejected. 
The outcome model in stage 2 addresses the problem of endogeneity caused by reverse causality 
between forecasted earnings and concentrated ownership. We use the GMM-method and estimate a sys-
tem of two equations: (1) absolute forecast error (AFE) as a function of a number of determinant varia-
bles, where we also include the inverse Mills ratio; and (2) the endogenous variable CONC, the extent of 
ownership concentration, as a function of AFE, control variables, and instruments that account for re-
verse causality. More formally, we have: (1) dependent variable = f (determinant variables, inverse Mills 
ratio); and (2) endogenous variable = g (instruments, dependent variable, control variables). Given this 
conceptual setup, we estimate the following system of linear equations involving the functions f and g: 
AFEi = f (FLEVi, AGEi, SIZEi, CONCi, H/Ci, MAIRi, IFRSi, IMILLSi) + ui,1  (3a) 
CONCi = g (AFEi, FLEVi, AGEi, SIZEi, H/Ci, MAIR) + ui,2     (3b) 
where IMILLS denotes the inverse Mills ratio, and IFRS is the dummy variable for the adoption 
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of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). We estimate the system of equations in (3) 
because, based on a Hausman test, the dependent variable CONC is endogenous in the first equation 
and jointly determined with AFE. 
We use two metrics of accuracy to measure the earnings forecast errors made by the manage-
ment of shipping IPO companies. In the simplest setup, the forecast error reflects the difference be-
tween the actual and predicted earnings figures for the same period: 
FEi,t = (APi,t – FPi,t)/|FPi,t|,          (4) 
where FEi,t denotes the forecast error; FPi,t denotes the forecasted profit before taxes over the 
next accounting period, as disclosed in the IPO prospectus; and APi,t is the reported/realized profit be-
fore taxes that corresponds to the accounting period for which the forecasts were made. Earnings are 
before taxes and extraordinary items. A positive value for the mean forecast error in in equation (4) im-
plies that IPO companies had a pessimistic bias (IPO underforecast), while a negative value indicates an 
optimistic bias (IPO overforecast). 
Because we are interested in determining the accuracy of earnings forecasts, in our regression 
analyses we use the absolute forecast error, labelled AFE. The AFE  measure is computed using the 
absolute value of the forecast error for each IPO, and indicates how close the forecasts were to actual 
(realized) profits in absolute terms: 
AFEi,t = |(APi,t – FPi,t)|/|FPi,t|.         (5) 
Although two-stage least-squares (2SLS) is an appropriate method of estimation, we use the 
GMM-method because it is more efficient than 2SLS when dealing with arbitrary heteroscedastic error 
terms, which may also be correlated (Wooldridge, (2001). Using the J-test and the F-statistic from the 
first stage regression allows us to test whether our choice is appropriate. 
Lewbel (1997) provides an important theoretical advance of the instrumental variables (IV) 
methodology. Assume that we start with equation Y = f (W, Z), where W are predetermined variables, 
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and Z are endogenous variables. Moreover, assume that G = G (W) is any function of W. Lewbel (1997) 
proves that valid instruments for equation Y = f (W, Z) are g×z, g×y, and y×z, where lower-case letters 
denote deviations from the means. Under symmetry of the error terms, z2 and y2 are also valid instru-
ments, which always satisfy at least the order conditions for identification. 
In our empirical setup, we have g = [SIZE, AGE, H/C,], z = [FLEV, MAIR], and y = [AFE, 
CONC], where lower-case letters of the functions denote that all variables are deviations from the mean. 
Assume that X = vech[g z, g y, y z, z z, y y] is the extended set of instruments, which are stacked 
in a single vector.13 Suppose there are Κ variables in the Χ vector; in our case, we have K = 20. Accord-
ingly, the GMM orthogonality conditions are as follows: 
n-1 AFEi − f (FLEVi, AGEi, SIZEi, CONCi, H/Ci, MAIRi, IFRSi, IMILLS; θ)) Xik = 0 (7a) 
n-1 CONCi – g (AFEi, FLEVi, AGEi, SIZEi, H/Ci, MAIRi; θ)) Xik = 0,   (7b) 
where i = 1,...,n (the number of sample firms); k = 1,...,n (the number of instruments); θ is the 
parameter vector in the linear models f and g; and Xik is the extended set of instruments. The GMM or-
thogonality conditions provide a total of 2K = 2×20 = 40 equations for the 16 parameters (including 
constant terms). 
We start our estimation with X = [FLEV, SIZE, AGE, H/C, MAIR, C] as the initial set of in-
struments. However, because some of the variables (except SIZE, AGE, H/C, and MAIR) may be en-
dogenous, we do not expect the corresponding estimators to perform well. We proceed with applying 
Lewbel’s (1997) methodology and use variables in X X, that is, the squares and cross-products of the 
variables in Χ, as instruments. Table 2 shows the correlation matrix of the control variables and results 
from the first-stage (reduced form) regressions, where the two endogenous variables AFE and CONC 
are regressed on all instruments. 
[Please Insert Table 2 about here] 
                                                          
13 The operator only selects the different elements in the various cross-products. 
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Weak instruments are a crucial issue in GMM estimation. If instruments are weak, 2SLS and 
GMM can lead to biases even in large samples, and the distributions may be non-normal (Stock and 
Yogo, (2005)). Wooldridge (2001) demonstrates that, in certain instances, the problem of weak instru-
ments can be extreme, implying that the (biased) OLS estimator should be preferred. As noted in Stock 
and Watson (2003), a simple guide for selecting an appropriate set of instruments is the F-statistic in the 
first-stage (reduced-form) regression. The null hypothesis is that all slope coefficients are zero, and an F-
statistic greater than 10 is usually assumed to suggest that the set of instruments is valid. Furthermore, 
valid instruments should be correlated with the endogenous variables and produce a high R-square in the 
first-stage regression. As shown in panel C of Table 2, using the initial naïve set of instruments delivers 
poor results in our application. The initial set of instruments fails the F-test criterion, while the Lewbel 
(1997) approach produces both very high coefficients of determination and F-statistics well above 10. 
We expect that the extended set of instruments using Lewbel’s (1997) methodology will deliver more 
reliable results. 
 
5. Descriptive Statistics and Empirical Results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 classifies shipping IPOs based on the country of domicile and their listing stock market. 
Given the maritime industry’s substantial contributions to the Greek economy since ancient times, the 
country is the leader in issuing activity, with twenty-nine listed shipping IPOs. Among those, nineteen 
provided earnings forecasts, and fifteen signaled a pessimistic bias (i.e., actual earnings were higher than 
those announced in the IPO prospectuses). The U.S. and Norway follow, with twenty-six and twenty 
listings, respectively. 
Regarding the market of listing, shipping companies seem to prefer the U.S. In fact, of our sam-
ple of 189 shipping IPOs, 68 were listed on the NYSE and the Nasdaq. Of those, 45 provided earnings 
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forecasts, despite being governed by the voluntary regime, and 28 announced a conservative forecast 
(i.e., actual earnings were higher than those announced in the IPO prospectuses). The second choice for 
shipping IPOs is the Oslo Stock Exchange, a robust peripheral market with a strong tradition in sea-
borne trade. 
[Please insert Table 3 about here] 
A large number of shipping companies opt to list their stocks on foreign stock exchanges rather 
than on exchanges in their home markets. As Table 4 shows, this was the case for 65 companies from 
our sample (mostly choosing the U.S. market). A major reason behind these decisions is that shipping 
companies continually need large amounts of funds because of their ever-increasing investment volumes. 
Larger, more established, and liquid stock markets enable them to raise capital on more favorable terms. 
Another reason for this preference toward foreign stock exchanges is that the institutional environments 
of the markets in several countries are more closely linked to the characteristics and requirements of the 
maritime industry (e.g., with MLP structures in the U.S. or trust structures in Singapore). 
[Please insert Table 4 about here] 
Table 5 analyzes potential determinants of earnings forecast accuracy. Specifically, we report FE 
and AFE in relation to offering size, age, and the ownership of the largest shareholder post-IPO. Panel 
A categorizes IPO firms by offering size. Large U.S.-listed shipping IPOs exhibit a low bias (as indicated 
by the FE metric), which increases for non-U.S-listed IPO firms. We observe a similar pattern for the 
accuracy measure, the AFE metric, with very large offers exhibiting mean AFEs of 41.97% and 60.43% 
for the U.S. and non-U.S. shipping IPOs, respectively. The smallest U.S.-listed firms exhibit the highest 
mean AFEs of 78.01%. Overall, although forecast errors are generally high, those of U.S.-listed IPOs are 
lower. This observation supports the notion that mature markets compel managers to provide investors 
with more reliable information. 
[Please insert Table 5 about here] 
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Panel B of Table 5 sorts IPO firms by age at the time of going public, computed as the year 
of the IPO minus the founding year. U.S.-listed shipping firms with a long pre-IPO operating history 
exhibit low mean FEs (0.69%), but high mean AFEs (102%). Against expectations, shipping compa-
nies with a long operating history seem unable to provide accurate earnings forecasts when going pub-
lic. Finally, panel C of Table 5 indicates that there is no clear relation between forecast errors and our 
ownership variable in a univariate setting. 
5.2 Empirical results 
Table 6 shows the results from the selection model, estimating the probit model in equation (2). 
Marginal effects are calculated as follows: 
i
i
iii xxEM  *)()(.  ,          (8) 
where αi is the probit coefficient of the variable xi  times the variable mean, summing over all var-
iables and multiplying by the specific probit coefficient. Firm age (AGE) is significant and positively re-
lated to the probability of forecasting earnings. A one percent change of a company’s age changes the 
probability that earnings will be forecasted by 0.4%. The coefficient on size (SIZE), which is negative 
and significant, implies that larger firms have a lower probability of announcing earnings forecasts. A 
one percent increase in the size of a firm will reduce the probability of forecasting earnings by 18%, con-
firming earlier results by Clarkson (2000). A change of EXC from zero to one increases the probability 
of forecasting earnings by almost 90%, implying that firms listed on developed market exchanges have a 
distinctly higher probability to announce earnings forecasts. Moreover, a change of H/C from zero to 
one, indicating a hot market period, increases the probability that earnings will be forecasted by 35%. As 
in Gong (2009) a one percent increase in market-adjusted returns (MAIR) reduces the probability of 
forecasting earnings by 0.8%. Finally, underwriter reputation exhibits a strong and positive marginal ef-
fect on the probability to forecast earnings, confirming Vismara et .al. (2015) and Gounopoulos et al.. In 
particular, a change of the variable UND from zero to one, indicating a high underwriter reputation, in-
creases the probability of forecasting earnings by 43%. 
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[Please insert Table 6 about here] 
Our main results are shown in Tables 7 and 8. In a first step, we control only for endogeneity in 
Table 7, and we use these results as our benchmark. Turning to the GMM-Lewbel regression results, we 
find that both financial leverage (FLEV) and size (SIZE) exhibit a positive and significant impact on the 
absolute forecast error (AFE), while age (AGE) has a significantly negative impact. Surprisingly, larger 
firms make more inaccurate forecasts. Concentrated ownership (CONC) is significant and positively cor-
related with the absolute forecast error. 
[Please insert Table 7 about here] 
In a second step, in Table 8 we report the results for our system of equations after controlling 
for both selection bias and endogeneity. Sample selection bias is important because the inverse Mills ra-
tio is significant at the 10% level. Most importantly, however, we find that all variables of importance for 
the AFE as the dependent variable, as already indicated in Table 7, maintain their significance and their 
sign. The probability value of the J-statistic confirms instrument exogeneity. Technically, to derive unbi-
ased and consistent coefficient estimates, the estimation methodology requires instrument variables. An 
appropriate instrument is a variable correlated with the regressor variables, but uncorrelated with the er-
ror term. In practice, good instrument variables are difficult to find, as documented in Bound, Jaeger, 
and Baker, (1995). Lewbel’s (1997) GMM methodology addresses this issue. As shown in panel C of Ta-
ble 2, based on the R-squared and the F-test criteria, Lewbel’s (1997) choice of instrument variables 
dominates the initial (naïve) set of instruments, thus yielding improved statistical inferences in the con-
text of a GMM methodology. 
[Please insert Table 8 about here] 
Another technical caveat is that several of the variables used in our analysis are assumed to influ-
ence both outcomes, and thus they are included as regressors in the probit and GMM stages of the mod-
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el. Therefore, the interpretation of the marginal effects for these variables must be adjusted to correct for 
selectivity bias as follows (Sigelman and Zeng (1999)): 
         (9) 
where Y is the dependent variable, S* is a latent variable denoting selection, βk and γk are the es-
timated coefficients for Xk in the outcome and selection equations, ρ is the correlation coefficient be-
tween the error terms of the selection and outcome equations, σε is the root mean squared error of the 
outcome equation, and δ(-wγ) is a function of the inverse Mills ratio, obtained from the linear predic-
tions (-wγ) of the selection equation. 
We observe that firm-level factors strongly impact the size of forecast errors. Specifically, the 
positive sign of the coefficient on financial leverage (FLEV) suggests that companies with an already 
high level of leverage before going public provide less accurate earnings forecasts in their IPO prospec-
tuses. Increasing FLEV makes the residual position of shareholders riskier and the cash flow-to-equity 
ratio more volatile, thereby decreasing the accuracy of earnings forecast. The marginal effect estimate 
shows that a one percent increase in financial leverage will increase the average forecast error by 0.16%. 
The coefficient on firm age (AGE) is negative and statistically significant. This finding confirms 
previous studies that report a positive relationship between forecast accuracy and age (Jaggi, (1997); Jelic, 
Saadouni, and Briston, (1998); Gounopoulos, Kraft, and Skinner, (2016)). Particularly in the shipping 
industry, one would expect that operational experience is reflected in more accurate earnings forecasts. 
Already a small increase in the age of the firm, one more year, will reduce the forecast error by almost 
0.01%. In contrast, and against expectations, we find a positive relationship between size (SIZE) and the 
inaccuracy of earnings forecasts. A small increase of one percent in a firm’s size will increase the average 
earnings forecast error by 0.57%. 
A unique characteristic of the maritime industry is the role of large shareholders and/or found-
ers. We expect to find that higher post-IPO ownership concentration (CONC) aligns with higher earn-
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ings forecast accuracy and lower forecast errors. In fact, it appears that firms providing earnings fore-
casts at the time of an IPO have a longer operating history, and their founders maintain a higher owner-
ship stake post-IPO. In addition to having a long track record and accepting under diversification of 
founders (by selling a lower proportion of their holdings), however, these firms seem to exploit infor-
mation asymmetries in a volatile sector and issue less accurate earnings forecasts in their prospectuses. 
Against expectations, the marginal effect implies that a small increase of one percent in the dominant 
shareholder’s ownership will increase the forecast error by 1.07%. 
For the state of the stock market, the coefficient on the H/C dummy variable is negative and sta-
tistically significant. This result suggests that IPO firms listed during a “hot” stock market environment 
tend to announce more accurate earnings forecasts. When the market is in a “hot” state, the average 
forecast error falls by 2.79%. In contrast, firms listed during a “cold” stock market environment are 
characterized by low individual investor participation. These firms could make their earnings forecasts 
less accurate to attract higher institutional investor participation. 
Looking at the results for the institutional factors, we find that IFRS adoption results in greater 
information accuracy. Firms with the greatest deviation of accounting practices from IFRS should thus 
have the most to gain from the transition (Brochet, Faurel, and McVay, (2011); Horton, Serafeim, and 
Serafeim, (2013)). When IFRS is adopted, the forecast error is 1.18% less. 
6. Discussion of Findings 
6.1 Why do shipping companies provide earnings forecasts? 
An important issue is why the maritime industry is different from other industries, in that ship-
ping companies exhibit a strong tendency to provide earnings forecasts at the time of their IPO. Alt-
hough not required by law, more than half of all our U.S. sample IPOs issued earnings forecasts. Pre-
sumably, providing this information is an attempt to reduce information asymmetry and to mitigate any 
potentially negative impact of shipping companies’ low credit ratings. Shipping bonds tend to be mostly 
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speculative or high-yield. On the one hand, the industry’s cyclicality, capital intensity, and high financial 
leverage may jeopardize expected cash flows, especially during periods of recession. On the other hand, 
certain characteristics of the shipping industry reduce the sectoral credit risks, for example, low technol-
ogy risk, low regulatory risk, and medium energy sensitivity. Overall, the industry’s risks, combined with 
its competitive environment, reduce shipping companies’ credit quality and increase their default proba-
bility. 
For instance, Grammenos, Nomikos, and Papapostolou (2008) examine 50 shipping bonds is-
sued during the 1992-2004 period. Most were assigned credit ratings of double-B, with a few firms ob-
taining single-B. They further analyze whether defaults could be predicted at the time of issuance, and if 
so, how. The following predictors for the probability of default are identified: relative issuing size, lever-
age ratio, working capital-to-total asset ratio, percentage of retained earnings, and shipping market condi-
tions. 
Taken together, financial decision makers in the maritime industry seem aware of the necessity of 
disclosing information and issuing earnings forecasts at the time of IPO to mitigate information asym-
metry, lower the perceived riskiness of the firm, and reduce the cost of equity capital (Botosan, (1997); 
Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia, (2007)). More generally, the quality of management—its managerial ob-
jectives, strategic planning, and delivery, as well as its ability and stamina to deal with adverse shipping 
market conditions—is signaled through the disclosure of earnings forecasts. When effectively communi-
cated to investors, these attributes may contribute to a narrower yield spread for a shipping bond issue 
and a lower cost of equity, along with sound investment, marketing, chartering policies, and prudent ves-
sel sale and purchase decisions. 
6.2 Why is financial leverage critical to the accuracy of earnings forecasts? 
Another issue is related to the impact of financial leverage on earnings forecasts, and thus the re-
action of strongly indebted companies to investors’ demands for additional information. Fridson and 
Garman (1998) note that the maritime industry is one of the most highly leveraged sectors, due to the 
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large initial investment required for purchasing ships and operating them on a daily basis. Drobetz et al. 
(2010) show that, on average, shipping companies carry higher leverage ratios than comparable industrial 
firms. Grammenos, Nomikos, and Papapostolou (2008) find that financial leverage is a major determi-
nant of shipping bond spreads and a predictor of the default probability of these bonds at the time of 
issuance. Taken together, the choice of leverage represents a key financing decision for shipping compa-
nies. Highly leveraged companies should attempt to limit the (expected) costs of financial distress, and 
issuing earnings forecasts at the time of IPO is one way to achieve that. Among the remaining shipping 
IPOs, however, there is evidence that higher leverage is negatively correlated with forecast earnings accu-
racy. High levels of debt increase the volatility of earnings, thus is becomes more difficult for managers 
to provide accurate forecasts. 
Our results advise shipping firms to control their debt levels when deciding to go public. Inves-
tors may not participate in a public offering where proceeds will be used to repay bank debts. Moreover, 
excessive debt levels will lead to severe difficulties for ship owners and management to provide accurate 
earnings forecasts. If shipping firms realize they cannot issue precise earnings forecasts, they may decide 
not to disclose any information, which in turn could negatively impact their reputation. 
6.3 Why do global market conditions affect the level of accuracy? 
A third issue concerns the role global market conditions play in earnings forecast accuracy. For 
example, Grammenos, Nomikos, and Papapostolou (2008) argue that market conditions have an overly 
strong influence on the maritime industry. They note that, between 1995 and 2000, a period of generally 
weak market conditions, bulk carriers on average were scrapped at 25.2 years of age and tankers at 24.7 
years. In 2006, however, a year of high earnings, the average scrapping age increased to 30 years for bulk 
carriers and 28 for tankers. Most recently, depressed market conditions have hit shipping markets and 
led to dramatic declines in freight rates and vessel prices. Several shipping companies defaulted on their 
high-yield bond issues. 
We find that shipping IPOs listed during hot stock market periods are more likely to provide 
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earnings forecasts. With respect to forecasting accuracy, our results indicate that going public in a hot 
market environment is a signal of high earnings quality.  
7. Additional Robustness Tests 
7.1. Foreign versus domestic listings 
The first robustness test controls for a foreign versus domestic stock market listing. In results 
not reported, we find that IPOs that go public in a domestic market experience reduced levels of under-
pricing, along with high absolute forecast errors. The results are economically significant, as shipping 
IPOs that opt to list in a foreign market are associated with an average 52% increase in initial returns, 
which translates into $13.19 million left on the table. With respect to accuracy, our results in Table 9 are 
affected by firm age, percentage of the highest shareholder, market conditions, exchange of incorpora-
tion, underwriter reputation, and institutional environment. In terms of listing in a foreign stock ex-
change, crucial factors for the accuracy of earnings are the size of the firm, the concentration of owner-
ship, underwriter reputation, and incorporation in Greece where mainly many companies select to list 
abroad. 
Finally, the recently adopted IFRS may have changed the level of earnings forecast errors for 
IPOs. If the new financial reporting standards negatively impact the level of forecast error, we would 
expect to find a negative coefficient on this interaction in our return regressions. We find that the coeffi-
cient on this variable is significantly different from zero, which reveals lower AFEs for IPOs that list in 
their domestic market. We thus conclude that the change in the financial reporting mechanism contrib-
utes to more accurate earnings forecasts. Regarding the listings in a foreign stock exchange, older and 
smaller companies tend to list abroad rather than in their home country, but especially smaller firms ex-
perience increased forecast errors. Among foreign listings, we report higher forecast inaccuracy for high-
ly financial leveraged shipping companies, and for those incorporated in Greece. 
7.2 Legal system effect 
The second relevant question relates to the effect of the legal system on the quality of absolute 
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earnings forecasts. Arguably, the differences between common and civil law systems affect manage-
ment’s attitude when deciding whether to provide earnings forecasts. To address this issue, we create 
two subsamples and test for earnings forecast accuracy in Table 9. We find that lower underpriced ship-
ping IPOs are associated with a higher probability of earnings forecast error in a civil law environment; 
higher underpriced IPOs fail to provide an accurate absolute forecast in a common law environment. 
The results further show that adopting IFRS in civil law countries improves the level of earnings forecast 
accuracy. However, in common law countries, it has the opposite effect. Finally, as expected, young, 
small, and highly leveraged shipping IPOs are associated with higher absolute forecast errors in a civil 
law environment, and high leverage, with low ownership concentration and high initial returns listed in a 
common law environment. 
[Please insert Table 9 here] 
8. Conclusion 
This study analyses the accuracy of IPO earnings forecasts at an international level. Since coun-
try-specific studies cannot tell much about the impact of institutions and regulations, our main contribu-
tion to the literature is that we provide evidence of management earnings forecast accuracy by conduct-
ing a cross-country study. Our analyses are based on a sample of 189 global shipping IPOs over the 
1989-2011 period. An interesting characteristic of our sample is that many U.S. shipping IPOs voluntari-
ly issued IPO earnings forecasts, although the SEC does not require it. 
Our results indicate that reported earnings tend to exceed forecasted earnings, which contradicts 
prior evidence that the management of IPO firms are typically overoptimistic in estimating future earn-
ings. Presumably, this is because managers in the maritime industry lack sufficient experience in predict-
ing the behaviour of their firms. Given the volatile environment shipping firms tend to operate in, they 
may also be cautious and reluctant to announce high earnings forecasts. Alternatively, they may antici-
pate that the market response to positive earnings surprises will increase share prices, leaving a good 
taste with investors. Therefore, they tend to deliberately report more conservative earnings forecasts in 
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order to support good long-term stock performance and be able to access the market again in the future 
if necessary. 
We find that idiosyncratic, market-based, and institutional factors affect management earnings 
forecast accuracy. In particular, high ship owner participation after going public is associated with less 
accurate earnings forecasts. Our results further indicate that financial leverage, a listing in an emerging 
stock market, and global market conditions are other main factors responsible for inaccurate earnings 
forecasts. The adoption of IFRS in civil law countries improves the level of earnings forecast accuracy, 
while it tends to weaken it in common law countries. 
In response to the questions raised in the introduction of this paper, we find that 1) firms in the 
shipping industry report biased IPO earnings forecasts, as they tend to be characterized by low levels of 
accuracy; 2) in most stock markets, issuers overstate information contained in economic variables; 3) 
while earnings forecasts are lower than actual earnings in the U.S., and the opposite holds for all other 
countries worldwide; and 4) paying underwriters for providing accurate earnings forecasts is value-
enhancing. Overall, this paper elucidates the long-standing puzzle of earnings forecast accuracy in IPOs, 
which is an important corporate finance issue. Our results suggest that the SEC may take action against 
and penalize firms that decide to report earnings forecasts for intentional manipulation of the market 
and fail to achieve some minimum level of accuracy. 
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Appendix A: Definition of  variables 
 
 
Variables Predicted 
sign 
Variable measurement Included in... 
 
stage 1 stage 2 
Panel A: Dependent variable 
 
AFE / FE 
 
 
Absolute forecast error (AFE) represents the magnitude of the 
error, while the average forecast error (FE) measures the bias 
in forecasts. The forecast error is calculated as the forecast for 
year t+1 earnings minus actual earnings for year t+1, scaled 
by the closing stock price at the beginning of year t. 
 x 
Panel B: Control variables 
FLEV + Financial leverage, defined as debt-to-equity ratio.   
AGE - Number of years a firm has been in operation before the year 
of listing. It is measured as the natural logarithm of age. 
 x 
LSIZE - Natural logarithm of the total market capitalization. x x 
CONC - Percentage ownership of the largest shareholder post-IPO. x x 
     
H/C + Market condition during the period of going public, which is 
detected on the basis of a double criterion: the number of IP-
Os performed during the respective quarter (intensity of IPO 
listing activity) and the quarterly returns for the Baltic Dry In-
dex (BDI) and on the stock exchange of listing. The dummy 
variables takes a value of 1 (hot market) if there is a booming 
market period, and 0 otherwise (cold market). 
x  
MAIR + Market-adjusted initial return, defined as the return to inves-
tors at the end of first day of trading minus the return of the 
market. Raw initial returns are adjusted for market changes, 
using the return on the respective national stock exchange 
between the offer price closing date and the end of first day of 
trading. 
x x 
UND - Underwriter dummy variable, which takes a value of 1 if the 
underwriter is reputable (high quality), and 0 otherwise. In-
formation is taken from Jay Ritter’s website, which ranks 1,167 
underwriters by quality. 
  
Incorporation 
in U.S. 
- Country of incorporation dummy variable, which takes a value 
of 1 if the company is registered in the United States, and 0 
otherwise. 
  
Incorporation 
in Greece 
- Country of incorporation dummy variable, which takes a value 
of 1 if the company is registered in Greece, and 0 otherwise. 
  
IENV + Institutional environment of the listing country dummy varia-
ble,  which takes a value of 1 if the IPO takes place in a  
common law country, and 0 if the IPO takes place in civil 
law country. 
x  
EXC - Stock exchange dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 
if the company is listed on stock exchanges in France, Japan, 
Germany, the US, or the UK, and 0 otherwise. 
x  
IFRS - IFRS dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if forecasts 
have been prepared in accordance with IFRS, and 0 if fore-
casts have been prepared in accordance with national GAAP of 
each country involved. 
 x 
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Table 1  
Sample Description 
This table presents details of our sample of global shipping IPOs. Panel A provides the number of listed shipping IPOs (full sample) in each calendar year. Panel B shows 
specific characteristics of shipping IPOs with management earnings forecasts. Panel C contains the same characteristics for shipping IPOs without management earnings 
forecasts, and panel D for all U.S.-listed shipping IPOs. Using selected company characteristics, panel E shows tests for differences (in means and medians) between the 
subsamples of shipping IPOs with and without management earnings forecasts. Panel F contains country-level descriptive statistics of global shipping IPOs. 
 
Panel A: Number of observations in shipping industry by forecasted profits 
 
Event year IPO firms Provide forecast No forecast Event year IPO firms 
 
Provide 
forecast 
No forecast 
Before 1989 9 5 4 2000 3 1 2 
1989 2 2 0 2001 4 4 0 
1990 2 2 0 2002 4 3 1 
1991 3 2 1 2003 10 9 1 
1992 7 6 1 2004 13 8 5 
1993 3 1 2 2005 31 23 8 
1994 6 3 3 2006 18 7 11 
1995 7 2 5 2007 18 11 7 
1996 7 6 1 2008 5 2 3 
1997 15 7 8 2009 1 0 1 
1998 10 3 7 2010 4 1 3 
1999 5 3 2 2011 2 0 2 
      Total  189 111 78 
Panel B: Characteristics of shipping IPO firms with earnings forecast 
 Mean Median SD Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
Total market capitalization of IPO (€ million) 475.92 266.01   747.08 5,067.43 4.47 23.73 
Age of issuing firm in years (AGE) 34.55 14.00  43.69 182.00   1.58 1.86 
Underwriter reputation (UND dummy) 0.56 -   0.49 - 0.21    - 
IPO listed in hot or cold market period (H/C dummy) 0.64 - 0.48 - -    - 
Ownership (in %) of largest shareholder post-IPO (CONC) 35.97 34.49 28.98 80.02 0.54 -0.52 
IPO listed on developed stock market (EXC dummy) 0.51 - 0.50 - -    - 
Market-adjusted initial return (MAIR) 2.86 -0.32 28.98 81.18 1.56 11.40 
Panel C: Characteristics of shipping IPO firms without earnings forecast 
 Mean Median SD Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
Total market capitalization of IPO (€ million) 360.00 161.80 159.14 437.32 6.39 45.33 
Age of issuing firm in years (AGE) 20.83 15.00 24.15 89.00 1.52 2.22 
Underwriter reputation (UND dummy) 0.41 - 0.49 - 0.37 - 
IPO listed in hot or cold market period (H/C dummy) 0.59 - .0.51 - - - 
Ownership (in %) of largest shareholder post-IPO (CONC) 28.29 22.16 29.70 77.03 1.08 0.15 
IPO listed on developed stock market (EXC dummy) 0.41 - 0.49 - - - 
Market-adjusted initial return (MAIR) 8.98 0.09 47.49 114.91 1.85 5.12 
Panel D: Characteristics of U.S.-listed shipping IPO firms 
 Mean Median SD Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
Total market capitalization of IPO (€ million) 442.04 379.01 289.03 1,198.80 0.87 1.07 
Age of issuing firm in years (AGE) 25.34 7.00 38.67 149.00 3.07 1.91 
Underwriter reputation (UND dummy) 0.86 - 0.34 - 3.12 - 
IPO listed in hot or cold market period (H/C dummy) 0.64 0.58 - - - - 
Ownership (in %) of largest shareholder post-IPO (CONC) 46.09 43.31 28.91 80.04 -0.87 0.34 
Market adjusted initial return (MAIR) 2.37 -0.30 41.22 35.02 15.53 2.51 
Panel E: Test for differences between IPOs with and without earnings forecasts 
 Mean Median  Mean Median 
Market capitalization (SIZE) (3.03)*** (-2.52)*** Largest shareholder post-IPO (CONC) (0.34) (-0.96) 
Age of issuing firm (AGE)                  (-0.96) (-1.71)*** Market-adjusted initial return (MAIR) (0.51) (-0.21) 
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Table 1 (Continue) 
 
 
Table 2 
Correlation Matrix 
This table presents pairwise correlations of the variables used as explanatory regression variables. The sample consists of global shipping IPOs that took place 
over the period January 1, 1990 to December 31, 2011. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
 
Panel F: Country-level descriptive statistics 
 
Country 
Market 
cap. 
(€ mill.) 
Age of 
firm in 
years 
(UND) 
Underwriter 
reputation 
(UND) 
Market 
condition 
(H/C) 
Largest 
ownership 
in % 
(CONC) 
MAIR 
(in %) 
Financial 
leverage 
(FLEV) 
% Listing  
on foreign 
stock exchange 
Belgium  237 115.00 0.33 0.33 40.10 8.06     2.15 0.00 
Bermuda 222 3.50 0.62 0.50 54.40 19.31 1.07 1.00 
Canada 327 39.00 0.50 0.75 66.00 7.62 1.96 1.00 
China 971 20.80 0.25 0.75 40.60 -1.91 0.40 0.00 
Denmark 214 93.00 0.40 0.60 16.00 11.80 0.25 0.20 
Finland 129 46.50 0.50 0.50 27.00 -3.00 0.10 0.25 
Germany  417 15.00 0.50 1.00 50.10 -15.00 0.69 0.00 
Greece 420 14.20 0.68 0.75 39.60 5.00 0.89 0.87 
Hong Kong 1,524 47.10 0.71 0.71 17.60 -9.40 0.83 0.14 
India 125 25.36 0.00 0.42 26.50 19.80 0.55 0.16 
Indonesia 83.5 12.41 0.00 0.0 47.30 48.30 0.40 0.00 
Italy 440 55.33 0.66 0.66 24.20 -19.60 0.74 0.00 
Japan 107 64.33 0.75 0.25 23.40 -7.20 0.62 0.00 
Malaysia 252 12.14 0.70 0.42 13.50 55.10 0.71 0.00 
Norway  257 46.42 0.05 0.50 27.80 7.30 1.73 0.00 
Philippines 67.5 46.00 0.00 0.00 38.40 47.30 0.37 0.00 
Russia 275 20.00 0.00 0.75 23.50 21.80 0.87 0.00 
Singapore 125 19.71 0.13 0.38 30.50 -5.60 0.54 0.00 
Sweden 58.5 5.80 0.00 0.60 23.60 -31.60 0.72 0.00 
Switzerland 754 39.00 1.00 0.00 27.40 -49.70 1.14 1.00 
Taiwan 1,305 22.33 0.00 0.00 11.70 -5.20 0.34 1.00 
U.K. 121 8.00 0.40 0.90 16.80 33.80 0.10 0.40 
U.S. 1,044 27.96 0.73 0.57 46.70 2.60 1.13 0.04 
 - NYSE 1,328 29.89 0.78 0.47 45.50 -0.80 1.27 - 
 - NASDAQ 293 31.60 0.61 0.80 60.10 12.10 0.82 - 
Panel A : Correlation matrix for shipping IPOs which provide earnings forecast 
 AGE SIZE CONC EXC H/C MAIR UND IENV 
SIZE -0.18        
CONC -0.14 0.25          
EXC -0.45    0.22 0.36      
H/C -0.09    0.01    0.22 0.22     
MAIR -0.07   -0.31   -0.06 -0.01 0.12    
UND -0.23    0.39    0.34 0.60 0.25 -0.21      
IENV -0.45    0.01    0.13 0.67 0.11 0.13    0.35     
FLEV -0.09    0.01    0.11 0.11 0.10 -0.04    0.11    0.06 
Panel B : Correlation matrix for full sample of shipping IPOs 
 AGE SIZE CONC EXC H/C MAIR UND IENV 
SIZE 0.05        
CONC -0.11 0.15       
EXC -0.22 0.23 0.31      
H/C -0.12 0.01 0.11 0.18     
MAIR -0.01 -0.15 -0.01 -0.03 0.15    
UND -0.06 0.37 0.30 0.56 0.08 -0.18   
IENV -0.19 0.10 0.18 0.53 0.05 0.14 0.35  
FLEV -0.01 0.13 0.29 0.16 0.06 -0.09 0.21 0.07 
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Table 3 
Optimistic/pessimistic earnings forecasts of shipping IPOs 
This table presents the classification of management earnings forecasts of shipping IPOs according to the level of forecast, i.e., optimistic or 
pessimistic forecasts, during the period January 1, 1990 to December 31, 2011. Panel A classifies the IPOs by country of domicile and stock 
market of listing. Panel B focuses on the most important shipping markets and reports the forecast error (FE), the absolute forecast error 
(AFE), and market adjusted initial return (MAIR) of the IPOs from issuers based in the major countries and listed on the major stock ex-
changes (SE). 
 
Panel A: Optimistic/pessimistic earnings forecasts by country of domicile and stock market of listing 
 
Country of 
domicile 
 
Number of 
issues  
 
Shipping 
IPOs with 
earnings 
forecast 
 
IPOs  
with (+) 
earnings 
forecast 
 
IPOs  
with (−) 
earnings 
forecast 
 
Stock market 
of- listing 
Number 
of issues 
Number of 
issues with 
earnings 
forecast 
IPOs  
with (+) 
earnings 
forecast 
 
IPOs  
with (−) 
earnings 
forecast 
 Belgium 3 3 0 3 Brussels SE 3 2 1 2 
Bermuda 7 1 0 1  - - - - 
China 8 1 0 1 Shanghai SE 3 - - - 
Canada 4 4 3 1  - - - - 
Denmark 5 4 2 2 Copenhagen 
SE 
4 4 2 2 
Finland 4 1 1 0 Helsinki SE - - -  
Germany 4 3 2 1 Frankfurt SE 3 3 2 1 
Greece        31       19       15 4 Athens SE 6 - - - 
Hong Kong 7 4 2 2 Hong Kong 
SE 
10 5 2 3 
India        12 5 3 2 Bombay SE 1
0 
5 2 3 
Italy 3 2 2 0 Milan SE 3 2 2 0 
Japan 4 0 0 0 Tokyo SE 4 - - - 
Malaysia 7 4 4 0 Kuala Lumpur 7 4 4 0 
Norway        20       15 9 6 Oslo SE 2
4 
1
5 
9 6 
Singapore 8 4 2 2 Singapore SE 9 2 3 
Sweden 5 3 1 2 Stockholm SE 5 2 0 2 
Taiwan 4 4 3 1 Taipei SE 4 3 3  
U.K. 5 2 1 1 London SE 6       
5 
4 1 
U.S.A. 26 20 12 8 NYSE 43 29 17 1
1 Other 22 12 7 5 NASDAQ SE 25 2
0 
1
3 
7 
     Other SE 18 7 6 1 
 
TOTAL 
 
189 
 
111 
 
69 
 
42 
 
 
189 
 
111 
 
69 
 
42 
Panel B: Underpricing and forecast error 
Country of 
domicile 
Total 
number 
of issues 
FE AFE MAIR Market of 
listing 
Total 
number 
of issues 
FE AFE MAIR 
Greece 19 3.1  61 11.97% Singapore SE           5         -9.9          14.45 10.05% 
India 5 35.41 53.63 16.15% Bombay SE 5 35.41 53.63 16.15% 
Norway 15 12.71 49.05 6.63% Oslo SE 12 0.05 50.44 6.38% 
USA 20 -9.07 75.73 2.24% NYSE 25 -14.5 64.18 -5.87% 
     NASDAQ SE 20 16.85 69.96 9.81% 
     London SE 5 27.46 30.27 10.12% 
 
Panel C: Selection of instruments 
Initial set of instruments: 
 R2 F-statistic 
Absolute forecast error (AFE) 0.20 1.19 
Ownership of largest shareholder post-IPO (CONC) 0.26 1.72 
Instruments based on Lewbel (1997): 
 R2 F-statistic 
Absolute forecast error (AFE) 0.98 384.84 
Ownership of largest shareholder post-IPO (CONC) 0.98 224.30 
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Table 4 
Earnings forecasts of foreign and domestic listed shipping IPOs 
This table presents details of management earnings forecasts of shipping IPOs. Panel A focuses on the geographical areas with most issuing ship-
ping companies (country of domicile). Panel B shows the summary statistics of shipping IPOs with foreign listings. Panel C shows the summary 
statistics of shipping IPOs with local listings. Panel D shows tests for differences (in means and medians) between the subsamples of shipping IP-
Os with local and foreign listings. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Geographical areas with most listings of shipping firms 
Country of domicile Total 
number of is-
sues 
IPOs with 
foreign  
listing 
IPOs with 
local 
listing 
Number of 
issues with 
earnings 
forecast 
IPOs with 
foreign  
listing 
IPOs with 
local 
listing 
Bermuda - Bahamas 12 12 - 2 2 - 
China + Hong    
Kong+Taiwan 
19 7 12 9 1 8 
Denmark + Germany 9 1 8 7 - 7 
Italy + Greece 34 26 6 21 19 2 
India 12 2 10 5 - 5 
Malaysia + Singapore 15 - 15 8 - 8 
Scandinavia 29 4 25 19 4 15 
U.K. 5 2 3 2 - 2 
U.S. + Canada 30 1 29 24 1 23 
 
Other 
 
24 
 
10 
 
16 
 
14 
 
7 
 
7 
 
Total 
 
189 
 
65 
 
124 
 
111 
 
34 
 
77 
Panel B: Shipping IPOs with foreign listing 
 Mean  Median Maximum 
Age of issuing firm in years (AGE) 17.11  7.00 64.00 
Ownership by the initial shareholders in % (CONC) 21.77  20.61 67.16 
Financial leverage (FLEV) 1.09  1.17 3.74 
Absolute forecast error in % (AFE) 64.02  58.83 166.00 
Forecast error in % (FE) -16.89  23.63 95.70 
Market adjusted initial return (MAIR) -2.92  -0.32 75.50 
Panel C: Shipping IPOs with local listing 
 Mean  Median Maximum 
Age of issuing firm in years (AGE) 46.89  38 38 
Ownership by the initial shareholders in % (CONC) 25.12  14.04 63.82 
Financial leverage (FLEV) 0.69  0.53 4.13 
Absolute forecast error in % (AFE) 55.71  42.56 137.42 
Forecast error in % (FE) -4.30  7.92 103.23 
Market adjusted initial return (MAIR) 4.26  -0.59 81.18 
Panel D: Test for differences between local and foreign listed shipping firms 
 Mean Median  Mean Median 
Absolute forecast error (AFE) (1.97)* (-1.68)* 
Largest shareholder post-
IPO (CONC) 
(-0.91) (0.97) 
Age of issuing firm (AGE) (-4.46)*** (-4.02)*** 
Market-adjusted initial 
return (MAIR) 
(2.15)* (1.98)* 
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Table 5 
Distribution of initial public offerings sample by offer size, age, and ownership 
This table presents forecast errors (FE) and absolute forecast errors (AFE) of management earnings forecast of U.S.-listed and non-U.S.-listed 
shipping IPOs (in %). Panel A provides categorizes IPOs by offer size, panel B by age, and panel C by ownership measured as the percentage 
of the largest shareholder post-IPO. 
 
Panel A: Forecast error (FE) and absolute forecast error (AFE) by size 
Offer size Sample Size U.S.-listed Sample size Non-U.S.-listed 
 
(mill.  €)  FE AFE  FE AFE 
<100 10 -10.8 
0 
78.01 11 -29.8 39.63 
100-200 7 5.9
0 
25.41 11 18.89 71.04 
200-300 8 4.6 18.18 10 -3.09 68.90 
300-500 7 -34.2 70.70 10 60.96 70.42 
500-1,000 7 34.3 56.47 10 -33.16 53.87 
>1,000 7 -1.92 41.97 9 -55.51 60.43 
Panel B: Forecast error (FE) and absolute forecast error (AFE) by age 
AGE Sample size U.S.-listed Sample size Non-U.S.-listed 
 
(years)  FE AFE  FE AFE 
0-10 18 -16.33 59.60 7 24.03 56.43 
11-20 9 -15.69 56.94 7 -31.16 73.69 
21-30 6 23.15 37.83 15 -18.49 52.80 
31-50 5 30.14 30.14 11 -1.24 39.56 
>50 8 0.69 102.0 21 -25.26 49.84 
Panel C: Forecast error (FE) and absolute forecast error (AFE) by ownership 
 
CONC 
Sample size U.S.-listed Sample size Non-U.S.-listed 
 
(in %)  FE AFE  FE AFE 
5-15 9 17.26 92.45 20 6.4 48.38 
15-30 10 42.21 90.86 14 -9.4 58.80 
30-50 10 -19.75 55.12 13 -14.9 36.75 
>50 17 26.80 52.16 14 -21.3 34.27 
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Table 6 
Probit regression for the decision to provide a forecast (selection regression) 
This table presents the results of the probit regression (first step) analysis for the choice between providing management earnings forecasts or not to announce this in-
formation (forecast/no forecast). See Appendix A for definitions of the variables. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% lev-
els, respectively. The standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity. 
 
Dependent variable: 
Forecast/No forecast 
Estimated coefficient Marginal effect 
Constant 2.834*** 2.798 
 (0.818)  
Firm age (AGE) 0.004*** 0.004 
 (0.001)  
Firm size (SIZE) -0.180*** -0.177 
 (0.05)  
Largest ownership post-IPO (CONC) -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.002)  
Stock exchange dummy (EXC) 0.907*** 0.895 
 (0.307)  
Market condition dummy (H/C) 0.352*** 0.347 
 (0.187)  
Market-adjusted initial return (MAIR) -0.008** -0.008 
 (0.003)  
Underwriter reputation (UND) 0.434** 0.428 
 (0.221)  
Financial leverage (FLEV) 0.035 0.034 
 (0.108)  
   
Prob. (J-statistic) 0.130  
# observations 189  
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Table 7 
Main regression results controlling for endogeneity 
This table presents the results from the second step GMM regressions, with the absolute forecast error (AFE) and largest ownership post-IPO 
(CONC) as the dependent variables (see equations 7a and 7b). See section 4.2 for details of the estimation methodology and Appendix A for defini-
tions of all variables. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. t-statistics in parentheses 
are robust for heteroscedasticity using the White (1980) method. 
 
 Estimation by GMM Estimation by Lewbel’s (1997) GMM 
 Dependent variable: Dependent variable: 
 AFE CONC AFE CONC 
Constant 0.244 0.372 -0.385 0.332** 
 (0.175) (0.467) (0.454) (0.149) 
FLEV 0.018 0.024 0.103*** -0.034** 
 (0.018) (0.041) (0.040) (0.018) 
AGE -0.008 - -0.003*** - 
 (0.006) - (0.002) - 
SIZE 0.023*** 0.044 0.093*** -0.034** 
 (0.010) (0.036) (0.037) (0.015) 
CONC 0.278*** - 0.952*** - 
 (0.067) - (0.258) - 
H/C 0.010 0.121 -1.832*** 0.951** 
 (0.090) (0.232) (0.627)*** (0.288) 
AFE - -1.558* - 0.259** 
 - (1.068) - (0.121) 
MAIR -0.006*  0.002 0.001 
 (0.003) -0.012 (0.006) (0.003) 
  (0.010) - - 
IFRS 0.035 - -0.722** - 
 (0.045) - (0.314) - 
     
# observations 189 189 189 189 
 Prob. (J-statistic): 0.118 Prob. (J-statistic): 0.234 
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Table 8 
Main regression result controlling both for selection bias and endogeneity  
 
This table presents the results from the second step GMM regressions using Lewbel’s (1997) methodology and including the inverse Mill’ ratio to 
control for sample selection, with the absolute forecast error (AFE) and largest ownership post-IPO (CONC) as the dependent variables (see equa-
tions 7a and 7b). See section 4.2 for details of the estimation methodology and Appendix A for definitions of all variables. The symbols ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. t-statistics in parenthesis are robust for heteroscedasticity using the 
White (1980) method. 
 
 Estimation by Lewbel’s (1997) GMM  
 Dependent variable: Marginal effects 
for AFE  AFE  CONC 
Constant -6.366* 0.335** -10.488 
 (3.666) (0.148)  
FLEV 0.106** -0.032** 0.157 
 (0.048) (0.018)  
AGE -0.004** - -0.009 
 (0.001) -  
SIZE  0.311** -0.035** 0.574 
 (0.144) (0.015)  
CONC 1.067*** - 1.067 
 (0.307) -  
H/C -2.286*** 0.990*** -2.792 
 (0.856) (0.294)  
AFE - 0.214**  
 - (0.123)  
MAIR 0.010 0.0004 0.021 
 (0.007) (0.002)  
IFRS -1.185*** -  
 (0.436) -  
Inverse Mill’s ratio 7.308* -  
 (4.394) -  
    
# observations 189 189  
 Prob. (J-statistic): 0.203  
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Table 9 
Robustness tests 
This table presents the results from the second step GMM regressions, with the absolute forecast error (AFE) and largest owner-
ship post-IPO (CONC) as the dependent variables (see equations 7a and 7b). Only the results for the AFE regression are reported. 
Estimation are for subsamples of shipping IPOs with domestic and foreign listings as well as listings in civil and common law coun-
tries. See section 4.2 for details of the estimation methodology and Appendix A for definitions of all variables. The symbols ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. t-statistics in parenthesis are robust for hetero-
scedasticity using the White (1980) met
 Domestic listings Foreign listings Civil law Common law 
 Dependent variable: 
 AFE FE AFE FE AFE FE AFE FE 
Constant 2.034 -6.140*** 11.710*** -3.968 3.519*** -3.660*** 0.6923 -1.459 
 (0.885) (2.046) (2.699) (2.398) (1.129) (1.633) (1.0261) (1.213) 
FLEV -0.084 0.1265 0.036** 0.096*** 0.531*** -1.435*** 0.1005*** -0.14*** 
 (0.063) (0.113) (0.021) (0.009) (0.117) (0.310) (0.014) (0.042) 
AGE -0.200*** 0.446*** 0.134*** 0.039 -0.160*** 0.432*** -0.051 -0.106 
 (0.045) (0.140) (0.061) (0.046) (0.039) (0.142) (0.033) (0.070) 
SIZE -0.042 0.251*** -0.579*** 0.137 -0.155*** 0.179*** -0.023 0.122** 
 (0.037) (0.082) (0.139) (0.098)  (0.059) (0.068) (0.052) (0.067) 
CONC -0.005*** -0.010*** -0.003 0.001*** 0.005 -0.009 -0.006*** 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) 
EXC -0.327** -0.047 0.006 -2.890*** -0.966*** 1.136*** 0.022 0.922*** 
 (0.196) (0.295) (0.363) (0.367) (0.209) (0.366) (0.104) (0.303) 
H/C 0.235*** 0.038 -0.103 2.076 0.174 -0.282 0.082 -0.085 
 (0.109) (0.186) (0.495) (1.430) (0.149) (0.250) (0.149) (0.194) 
MAIR -0.003*** -0.0003 - - -0.005*** - 0.004 *** 0.005*** -0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) - - (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
UND 0.434*** -0.256 0.521 1.22*** 0.101 -0.003 0.214 0.267 
 (0.166) (0.256) (0.427) (0.409) (0.155) (0.208) (0.159) (0.182) 
IFRS -0.296*** - -0.720*** - -0.856*** - 0.560*** - 
 (0.104) - (0.224) - (0.243) - (0.137) - 
Incorporation in U.S. 0.747*** 0.630 - - - - 0.625*** 0.784** 
 (0.1928)  (0.454) - - - - (0.121) (0.453) 
Incorporation in Greece 0.086 3.218*** -0.089 0.621*** - - 0.2601*** 0.224 
 (0.327)  (1.533) (0.165) (0.070) - - (0.101) (0.234) 
IENV -0.461*** 0.636*** - - - - - - 
 (0.135) (0.329) - - - - - - 
         
Prob. (J-statistic) 0.77 0.67 0.57 0.76 0.516 0.475 0.675 0.720 
# observations 72 72 35 35 40 40 67 67 
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